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Abstract. Differently from Atkinson and Morelli (2011) who detect no clear link between increases 
in income inequality and systemic banking crises, we show that a large majority of crises occurred 
between 1982 and 2008 have been preceded by persistently high levels of income inequality. Such 
association is robust when considering  Gini values for incomes after-tax as well as before-tax and 
transfers. Moreover, we investigate the pattern of income inequality levels before and after a group 
of banking crises and the relative levels of income inequality in a large sample of OECD countries 
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1. Introduction 
 In the last three decades – and especially in the ‘90s – many developed countries have 
experienced significant increases in income inequality. Between mid-1980s and the late 2000s the 
value of the Gini index (for disposable incomes) grew by almost 10% in OECD countries1 and 
similar trends are observable also elsewhere. Some emerging countries (like Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa) actually show inequality increases even higher than most OECD 
economies. 
By looking at the evolution of the distribution of household income, some scholars2 have also 
detected that the increase in inequality was often driven by  remarkable rising in top income shares 
(top 1%, for instance). This phenomenon has been especially observed initially in English-speaking 
countries and later also in continental Europe and Japan. In this group of countries, after a 
significant reduction over time, top incomes shares started growing in the ‘70s and reached their 
peaks in the late 2000s.   
The similar trends in income concentration that one may recognize in the US before the 1929 
financial crisis and before the 2007 one  have probably motivated some economists to look closer at 
the relationship between income inequality and banking (and economic) crises. Stiglitz (2012) 
argues forcefully that the increasingly uneven income distribution undermined US households 
consumption especially in the lower part of the distribution. Households reacted to stagnating 
incomes by expanding their borrowing to keep track with their expected living standard. Such credit 
boom in a poorly regulated and risk-loving financial system later proved unsustainable. The 
explosion of the housing bubble then fired the flammable banking sector. Fitoussi and Saraceno 
(2009), Milanovic (2009) and Stockhammer (2012) claim that the roots of the recent crisis have to 
be found in long-run structural changes in income distribution.3  
Although evocative, the above arguments have not been submitted to empirical tests by their 
proponents and the belief that there may exist a link from inequality to crises needed to be 
challenged on statistical playgrounds. A first investigation has been performed in an important 
                                                          
1 See OECD (2011). 
 
2 See Atkinson and Piketty  (2011) for an excellent account of their own results and an updated survey of the 
relevant literature. 
 
3 See also the survey by van Treeck and Sturm (2012). Different views on the relationship between income 
inequality and financial crises have been debated also in the New York Times: see Story (2010). 
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paper by Atkinson and Morelli (2011), AM11 henceforth.4 Postponing to section 2 the details of 
AM11, it is worth noting from now one of their main conclusions: there is no clear link between 
changes in income inequality and the occurrence of systemic banking crises. 
Although the analysis and the results in AM11 are certainly very interesting, we think that one 
important element of the relationship between inequality and banking crises is missing in their 
investigation. Specifically, we believe that levels of income inequality are not less important than 
changes in trying to understand the association between income inequality and banking (and 
economic) crises. Hence, our paper aims at complementing AM11, by addressing their same basic 
question with reference to levels of income inequality for a subset of their sample of episodes of 
banking crises. We shall consider persistent (up to ten years long) high (above the timely OECD 
average) levels of overall income inequality (as measured by Gini coefficient) for systemic banking 
crises that occurred after 1945.  
By performing a statistical analysis along the same lines of AM11, we checked how many 
countries, that experienced banking crises, fell above or below the relevant OECD average 
inequality level, used as a benchmark. Notwithstanding the severe limitations imposed by the 
availability of consistent data on Gini coefficients, our conclusions about the association between 
income inequality and banking crises are significantly different from AM11 ones.   
Specifically, we find that: (1) using both after-tax and before-tax household incomes, a large 
majority of classifiable banking crises has been preceded by persistently high levels of Gini 
coefficients vis-à-vis the relevant OECD average; (2)  the occurrence of banking crises does not 
seem to modify income inequality levels relative to timely OECD averages; (3) focusing on OECD 
countries that did not experience banking crises in the last thirty years, the number of high-
inequality countries is almost equal to the number of low-inequality ones, except for the 2000’s 
when the latter slightly prevails on the former.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the contribution by Atkinson and 
Morelli (2011) and underlines the differences between their analysis and ours. Section 3 presents 
our results for the distribution of disposable income (i.e., after-tax and money transfers) and section 
4 for income before-tax and transfers. Section 5 looks at the pattern of inequality before and after 
banking crises and investigates the levels of income inequality in countries that did not host banking 
crises. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
                                                          
4 We focus on banking crises only, but AM11 also investigate the link between income inequality and 
economic (and consumption) crises. 
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2. The contribution of Atkinson and Morelli  
 In AM11, Atkinson and Morelli investigate empirically the relationship between changes in 
income inequality and banking crises. They test both directions of the relationship: from income 
inequality to banking crises and vice-versa. Let us summarize their own approach and the 
conclusions. 
First of all, they identify the systemic banking crises by using three different databases assembled 
by Bordo et al. (2001), Laeven and Valencia (2008) and (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)5. 
According to such criteria, they identify in the world 72 episodes in the period 1911-2010 (see their 
Table A.1). Hence, they focus on a subset of 37 banking crises occurred in years and countries 
where data on income distribution are available: “Information about an overall measure of 
inequality, typically the Gini coefficient, will be given priority with respect to any other measure of 
inequality in our database. In the absence of an overall measure, we will turn to top income shares 
and ultimately to the poverty index” (AM 11, p. 16).  
Gini coefficients for equivalized household disposable incomes are their preferred figures; when 
these are not available, they use other statistics on household incomes (top 1% income share and 
poverty index) and carefully motivate their choices. When using the Gini index as a measure of the 
distribution of income, if the crisis occurred at T, they compare the average value of the Gini index 
for the years (T-6, T-5, T-4) with the value at (T-1). Then, they record a “change in income 
inequality” when the Gini index changes by about two thirds of a percentage point (say, from 0.30 
to 0.3065).  
To be more precise, consider a banking crisis occurred in the i-th country at date T. Let us denote 
with Git the value of Gini coefficient for country i in year t and with Gi the average of Gini 
coefficients for country i in the relevant period. The relevant period for AM11 is the time span [T-6, 
T-4]; hence, when using Gini coefficient,  they compute Gi  as: 
𝐺𝑖 = � 𝐺𝑖𝑡/3𝑇−4
𝑡=𝑇−6
 
and operate a partition as follows. Income inequality in the i-th country  is considered to be: 
increasing if  (Gi  − Gi,T-1)  > 0.0065; 
decreasing if (Gi   − Gi,T-1)  < − 0.0065; 
                                                          
5 See AM11, Appendix, for the details of how they combine the criteria adopted in the three databases.  
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stable if (Gi  − Gi,T-1)  ∈ [− 0.0065, + 0.0065].   
The quality of the dataset allow them to focus only 22 of the 37 banking crises initially considered. 
In 6 cases inequality increased before the crisis episodes; in 6 cases it declined; in 10 cases it varied 
by less than the critical threshold (see their Table 1). This evidence does not confirm the allegedly 
underlined link between trends in income distribution and systemic banking crises. Moreover, no 
clear pattern emerges in the trend of overall income inequality before and after the banking crises. 
In fact, as for the trend of income inequality after a banking crisis, they show that income inequality 
declined 8 times, was stable 8 times and increased 13 times. No clear pattern seems to emerge for 
overall income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, whereas changes in top shares seem 
to have some predictive power. 
This is the summary of AM11 conclusions about the relationship between changes in income 
inequality and banking crises in 25 countries. As for the relevance of levels of income inequality, 
they plainly admit that “the level hypothesis cannot be ruled out at this stage” (AM11, p. 49). This 
is the starting point of our contribution.  
Notice that AM11’s conclusions have already affected the debate about the issue. For instance, 
Glaiser (2010) quote their paper to reject any correlation between income inequality and banking 
crises. Bordo and Meissner (2012) develop an empirical analysis to contrast the claim – put forward 
by Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Ranciere (2010), for instance – that in the United States rising 
inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis both in the late ‘20s and at the 
end of the last decade. Using top income shares for the measurement of inequality trends, Bordo 
and Meissner (2012) argue against the alleged inequality-credit-crisis nexus.6 Krugman (2012), 
without quoting AM11, looks quite skeptical about explanations of (banking and) economic crises 
based on the trend of increasing inequality observed especially in the USA. He does prefer to look 
for political arguments behind the deepest roots of the recent crisis.  
 
3. Inequality and banking crises: incomes after-tax and transfers 
 In this section we investigate the relationship between persistently high levels of 
(disposable) income inequality and banking crises. More precisely, we proceed as follows: 
(i) We adopt the same criteria as AM11 for the identification of systemic banking crises. 
                                                          
6 A related paper by Bordo and Meissner (2011) will be commented  in section 5 below.  
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 (ii) We use the value of  Gini coefficient as a measure of overall inequality of household disposable 
incomes (see Appendix A.1). 
(iii) For each banking crisis, we calculate the average value of the Gini coefficient between (T-10) 
and (T-1), where T is the start year of the banking crisis, supposed to last one year only. This means 
that, at most, we average 10 values, although in many cases we have to rely on less observations.  
(iv) For each crisis, we compare the average value of Gini coefficients (for the country where the 
banking crisis took place) with the relevant value of the Gini average for OECD countries. When 
the relevant time interval includes two OECD averages (usually available every 5 years), we 
average them to obtain the threshold.  
(v) By means of step (iv), we classify banking crises into two groups, depending on whether the 
Gini average value is above or below the threshold represented by the OECD average.  
Our starting point is given by a subset of the 26 banking crises reported in AM11 (in their Table 
A.1) for the post-1945 period. In fact, step (iii) above and our requirements on the quality of the 
dataset (see Appendix A.1) allow us to collect the relevant information on income after-tax income 
inequality only for 14 episodes in 12 countries in the period 1984-2008, listed in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Notice that 9 (out of 12) countries are OECD members and 11 (out of 14) banking crises occurred 
in OECD countries. This characteristic of our first sample makes the choice of the OECD average 
as benchmark a bit less discretionary. The group of 18 countries that have experienced banking 
crisis in the last thirty years include indeed many OECD members and, among them, the top-ranked 
economies in terms of aggregate GDP (excluding China). 
Proceeding now as we explained through steps (ii)-(iv), we compute the relevant Gini indexes and 
the values of the OECD benchmarks. The relevant period, for us, goes back up to nine years with 
respect to the year before the start of the crisis. Hence, 
𝐺𝑖 = � 𝐺𝑖𝑡/𝑁𝑖𝑇−1
𝑡=𝑇−10
 
where Ni is the number of available observations for country i in the relevant period. Let GOT be the 
average value of Gini coefficients for  OECD countries available in the period between t1 and t2, 
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where t1 ≥ T-10 (t2 ≤  𝑇 − 1) is the earliest (latest) year used to calculate Gi. We argue that, for a 
crisis occurred at time T in country i, this country experienced persistently high income inequality 
before the banking crisis if Gi  > GOT, whereas it did not if   Gi ≤  GOT . 
Thus, while AM11 look at short-run changes in the levels of income inequality, we focus on 
longer-run levels of income inequality as compared to the relevant level of OECD average. 
For each crisis we succeeded to classify, the third column of next table shows whether the average 
Gini index Gi  is above or below the average OECD Gini index GOT. The Gini index Gi was 
computed with an average number of  6.8 observations (years) per crisis (see Appendix A.1). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
It turns out that 9 banking crises out of 14 have been preceded by persistently high levels of high 
(disposable) income inequality. Although the sample of banking crisis we succeed to classify is 
fairly small, the association does not look negligible at all. About two thirds of the banking episodes 
occurred in countries experiencing, before the crisis, levels of overall income inequality above the 
OECD average (see Figure 1).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The average distance (across crises for countries above the OECD average) from the OECD average 
(source OECD) is 0,028 percentage Gini points, with a minimum difference of 0,0052 for Spain and 
a maximum difference of 0,054 for US in 2007. Eliminating these two outliers, the average distance 
becomes 0,027. Thus, in general, our conclusions seem fairly robust to measurement errors and the 
potential bias induced by outliers. 
In the data challenge, one concern is related to the choice of the benchmark. So far, we limited our 
attention to data on OECD countries provided by OECD itself. As a further control, we compute a 
different average of Gini coefficients in OECD countries using data from Luxembourg Income 
Studies (LIS). Such dataset provides our preferred income data on overall income inequality (that is, 
equivalized disposable household income) for several OECD countries in the last decades. 7 The 
last column of Table 2 summarizes the outcome of this additional comparison between income 
                                                          
7 The LIS dataset on incomes is precisely designed and built to ease cross-countries investigations.  
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inequality indexes of our 12 countries and this newly computed benchmark (see Appendix A.2). 
The results of the third column are again confirmed.8 
We are also aware that our income inequality data suffer from heterogeneity of sources, as we 
preferred to emphasize the length of countries’ time series of Gini coefficient rather than the 
homogeneity of data sources across countries. To partly offset this limitation, we make a control 
using the LIS dataset. We select LIS available data on Gini coefficient in the decade before the 
banking crisis and we average them. Exactly as before, we then compare such averages with the 
relevant OECD averages (OECD source). Although the number of observations is smaller than in 
our previous sample 9, our conclusions are confirmed for all 9 crises for which we have data. 
Unfortunately, we cannot perform such a robustness check for the remaining 5 crises (which took 
place in Iceland, India, Indonesia and Japan) as these countries are not recorded in the LIS database 
which covers OECD countries only.   
If we compare our conclusions based on levels of income inequality and those of AM11 based on 
changes in the levels, there are relevant differences in the classification of countries/crises. For 
instance, US did not experience a relevant change in income inequality before the 2007 banking 
crisis (so they fall under the category of “stable” in the AM11 taxonomy), but it is classified as 
ABOVE according to our criteria. On the other hand, for example, Iceland turns out to be 
“increasing” in AM11 and BELOW in the classification of our Table 2. 
A simple scrutiny of Table 2 suggests at least a couple of remarks. First, there is a sort of “Nordic” 
exception: all BELOW countries but Germany belong to Northern Europe. Second, and most 
important, while about two thirds of the banking crises occurred in countries featured by 
persistently high income inequality, these 8 countries weight much more than two thirds (within the 
sample) in terms of population, GDP, shares of the international banking sector, and so on. Except 
for Germany, the most important economies of our (small) sample are ABOVE.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Actually, using WIID database instead of the OECD one in computing Gi for Germany, this country would 
cross the threshold and turn out to be ABOVE. 
 
9 Given the scarcity of LIS data for the relevant period, we use also the value of the Gini coefficient in the 
year T of the crisis, whereas in the previous elaboration we considered the period from (T-10) to (T-1). 
However, for some countries (e.g., Finland), we may be forced to use only one observation. 
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4. Inequality and banking crises: income before-tax and transfers 
 We now perform the same exercise through steps (i)-(v) as in Section 3 by looking at 
incomes before State intervention. Hence, as for step (ii), we concentrate on incomes before-tax and 
transfers. Data availability allows us to collect statistics on Gini coefficient for the following 
countries/crises (see Appendix A.1). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Notice that this larger sample substantially overlaps with the one in Table 1, but now the relative 
number of banking crises in OECD land shrinks from 11/14 to 8/18 and the new entries are all from 
South America and Asia. 
Similarly to Table 2, next table shows, for each crisis episode, whether the Gini index Gi is above or 
below the OECD average index GOT. In this case, we show our conclusions both for the whole 
sample and for a restricted one which includes only cases for which at least 3 observations were 
available to compute our average Gini index Gi. For the former we succeed to collect an average 
number of 4.5 observations per crisis, while for the latter such number is 7.5. 
 [Insert Table 4  here] 
 
Using Gini coefficients for incomes before-tax and transfers, we find that, for the unrestricted 
sample, banking crises have been preceded by persistently high levels of income inequality in 12 
out of 18 cases, whereas in the restricted sample the ratio is 8 out of 9 cases. Again, the relationship 
between high levels of inequality and the occurrence of banking crises seems to be confirmed. 
Notice that BELOW countries are either in Northern Europe or in Asia. Moreover, if we go beyond 
the simple arithmetic, we see that, with the exception of Japan, the largest economies of the sample 
fall into the ABOVE category (see Figure 2 for the unrestricted sample). 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
. 
The average distance (across crises for countries above the OECD average) from the OECD average 
is now 0,048 percentage Gini points, with a minimum difference of 0,008 for Italy and a maximum 
difference of 0,157 for Brazil in 1994. Eliminating these two outliers, the average distance becomes 
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0,053. Thus, in general, our conclusions seem again fairly robust to measurement errors and the 
potential bias induced by outliers. 
With respect to the ABOVE/BELOW classifications of Tables 2 and 4, notice that some countries 
behave differently depending on whether incomes are before- or after-tax and transfers. Germany 
shows a higher (than OECD average) Gini coefficient before-tax and transfers, but its redistributive 
policies make its after-tax income inequality falling below the average. Such policies seem 
comparatively less effective in Indonesia and Japan that stay BELOW in Table 4, but remain 
ABOVE the OECD average in Table 2.  
 
5. A further look 
 In this section we investigate two issues. The first deals with the pattern of income 
inequality before and after the banking crises.  
We have already seen the levels of Gini coefficients for incomes after tax and transfers - as 
compared to OECD averages -  in the decade preceding a group of banking crises and Table 2 
summarizes our conclusions. Now we detect the relative position of each country’s income 
inequality within 5 years (or less, for the 2007-8 crises) after the crisis: more precisely, we compute 
the average value of Gini coefficient in the period from (T+1) to (T+6). The benchmark is still 
provided by the OECD average (see Appendix A.2). Table 5 below summarizes the outcome of 
such test for disposable incomes. We could not replicate the same test for before-tax incomes, due 
to lack of a sufficient number of observations. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Only in 11 cases out of 14 we succeed to record the pattern of relative income inequality levels (vis-
à-vis the OECD average) after the crisis. Hence we are left with an even smaller sample; moreover, 
the number of observations after the 2007/8 banking crises is obviously small too. With these 
limitations, Table 5 suggests that banking crises do not seem to modify the relative levels of 
(disposable) income inequality. This finding is consistent with AM11 who, as we noticed in Section 
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2, do not discover any typical pattern in income inequality before and after a group of banking 
crises.10 
These conclusions contrast with those of Honohan (2005), Bordo and Meissner (2011) as well as 
with those of Agnello and Sousa (2011). The former concentrates on banking crises in emerging 
economies in the ‘90s and find that income inequality generally falls after the episodes. Bordo and 
Meissner (2011) detect the trend in top income shares in the five years after banking crises occurred 
between 1880 and 2000 in 16 countries and find that generally financial crises (including banking 
crises) increase income inequality. Agnello and Sousa (2011) show an inverted V-shape pattern in 
income inequality before and after banking crises in a large sample of countries in the period 1980-
2006.11  
Finally, one may wonder whether high inequality (in the sense of ABOVE the average) 
characterized also countries that did not experience banking crises. Clearly, this would significantly 
undermine our main conclusions. Thus, the second issue that we tackle in this section deals with the 
levels of income inequality in countries that did not experience banking crises.  
We confine our attention to OECD countries and we distinguish three periods: ‘80s (1981-1990), 
‘90s (1991-2000) and 2000s (2001-2010). Due to shortage of reliable observations, we limit 
ourselves to point-wise surveys. Hence, for each country without banking crisis in the relevant 
decade, we collect the value of  Gini coefficient in the year closest to the year in which we record 
the OECD average (see Appendix A.2); then, we compare the country’s Gini value and the OECD 
average of the same decade. We first consider after-tax incomes (Table 6) and then before-tax 
incomes (Table 7). For each decade we detect whether a country is above or below the OECD 
average. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
                                                          
10 To be precise, in AM11 after means  “in the period from (E+3) to (E+5) if the crisis ends at year E”.  
 
11 They consider Gini values for a group of 62 countries, identify banking crises through the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) criteria and estimate a dynamic panel data model on different time horizons.  
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Apparently, the lack of banking crises seems uncorrelated with the relative level of disposable 
income overall inequality. From Table 6 we see that only in the 2000s the number of countries 
BELOW is greater than the ABOVE one (12 vs. 8), whereas in the ‘80s (8 vs. 8) and the ‘90s ( 9 vs. 
11) the evidence is even fuzzier than in the last decade. Hence, while Table 2 suggests a non- 
negligible association between persistently high levels of income inequality and the occurrence of 
banking crises, there does not seem to be a significant association between income inequality 
measures and the lack of banking crises in a fairly large sample of OECD countries.  
Similar conclusions hold also for before-tax income inequality, as shown in Table 7. Specifically, 
the number of countries BELOW vis-à-vis the ABOVE one is 4 vs. 6 in the ‘80s, 8 vs. 8 in the ‘90s. 
In the 2000s, there is a slight majority (12 vs. 7) of countries BELOW the average, as it happened 
with after-tax incomes collected in Table 6. This last evidence somehow supports our main claim 
about a positive relationship between income inequality and the occurrence of banking crises.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 In this paper we have shown that a large majority of classifiable banking crises in the last 
thirty years has taken place in countries whose income inequality before the crisis was persistently 
higher than the OECD relevant average. This conclusion holds true for both incomes after-tax and 
before-tax and transfers. Moreover, banking crises do not seem to have modified the relative 
position of income inequality of hosting countries vis-à-vis average OECD levels. Finally, only in 
the 2000s relatively low income inequality seems associated to the lack of banking crises, whereas 
in the previous decades we do not detect any clear association.  
Developing theoretical arguments that could rationalize these findings goes beyond the scope of our 
investigation. Different stories might be consistent with the evidence that we have collected.12 
While we refer to AM11 (p. 43-46) to envisage possible mechanisms through which income 
inequality can generate a greater risk of crises, we limit ourselves to a few remarks. 
First, persistently high levels of (after-tax) income inequality in late ‘90s and early 2000s may have 
driven an excess of households borrowing and contributed to undermine banks solidity in a strongly 
deregulated banking industry. Countries like Spain, UK and USA seem to confirm such mechanism, 
although we can hardly extend this explanation to other periods/countries. 
                                                          
12  However, with the exception of Kumhof and Ranciere (2010), we are not aware of fairly complete 
economic models showing a clear relationship between income inequality and financial crises. 
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Second, persistently high levels of  (before-tax) income inequality may have induced policy makers 
to increase redistribution through large public expenditure and taxation along mechanisms like 
those pioneered by Meltzer and Richard (1981) and later extended to growth by Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). Worsening public deficits and debts (and rising interest 
rates), such policies may have depressed growth and ultimately deteriorated banks stability. 
Third, one may notice that some countries seem characterized by structurally high or structurally 
levels of income inequality. Among the former, we may mention Argentina and Brazil, whereas 
Nordic countries seem to belong the latter group. For all these countries, the association between 
levels of income inequality and banking crises (or the lack of them) could be interpreted as a 
coincidence.  
It is well known that there is a serious data challenge in exploring income distribution, especially as 
far as cross-countries analyses of income inequality are concerned. Optimizing the quality of data 
(in terms of time consistency and international comparability) unavoidably shrinks the size of 
samples. However, we have successfully used LIS data to check the robustness of our conclusions 
regarding after-tax incomes. Moreover, the average distances of countries Gini coefficients from the 
thresholds seem large enough to protect our findings from measurement errors. 
Finally, we have remarked that the analysis should go beyond the simple arithmetic of counting 
crises/countries. Almost all biggest economies of our samples (listed in Tables 1 and 3) fit our main 
conclusion about a positive association between persistently high levels of income inequality and 
the occurrence of banking crises. So, as long as high income inequality is associated to banking 
crises in “big” countries, then such inequality should be of some concern for the whole system, 
given the interdependency of financial markets and the resulting contagion outside national 
boundaries. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 The dataset13 
In selecting data sources on Gini coefficient for countries of our sample of Table 2, we use the 
following lexicographic criterion: (1) at least three years in the relevant period [T-10, T-1]; (2) the 
dataset by Atkinson and Morelli (2012) - AM12 henceforth14 - or the longest time series between 
OECD (2011, Overview, Fig. 2) and WIID (UNU-WIDER, 2008).  
As for data in Table 4, for the restricted sample we use at least three observations from OECD 
(2011, Dataset: Income Distribution) or WIID. For the unrestricted sample, we use at least two 
observations available from either source. 
For each country/crisis, we now specify the statistical source and the years of available data. We 
begin from countries/crises listed in Table 2. 
FINLAND (1991): AM12; 1987-1990. 
GERMANY (2007): AM12; 1997-2006. 
ICELAND (2007): AM12; 2003-6. 
INDIA (1993): AM12; 1983-1992. 
INDONESIA (1992): AM12; 1984, 1987, 1990. 
INDONESIA  (1997): AM12; 1990, 1993, 1996. 
ITALY (1990): AM12; 1981-84, 1986, 1987, 1989. 
JAPAN (1992): WIID; 1986, 1989, 1992; Notice that only in this case, for this sample, we use the year of the 
crisis to reach the minimum number of three observations. 
NETHERLANDS (2008); AM12, 1998-2007. 
SPAIN (2008): WIID; 1999-2002, 2004-2006. 
SWEDEN (1991): AM12; 1981-90. 
UNITED KINGDOM (2007): AM12; 1997-2006. 
UNITED STATES (1984): OECD; 1979-1983. 
UNITED STATES (2007): OECD; 1997-2006. 
 
We now report the same type of information for countries/crises listed in Table 4. Notice that there 
are some overlaps of observations among crises: 2 between Argentina 1989 and 1995; 4 between 
Argentina 1995 and 2001; 6 between Brazil 1990 and 1994. 
ARGENTINA (1989): WIID; 1983, 1985, 1987, 1988. 
                                                          
13 All data used to create Tables 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are recorded in Excel sheets available upon request. 
 
14  AM12 have done an excellent work in selecting data from different datasets to ease consistency over time.  
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ARGENTINA (1995): WIID; 1987- 1989, 1991-94. 
ARGENTINA (2001): WIID; 1991-2000. 
BRAZIL (1990): WIID; 1980, 1981, 1983-89. 
BRAZIL (1994): WIID; 1984-90, 1992, 1993. 
GERMANY (2007): OECD; 2000, 2005. 
INDONESIA (1992): WIID; 1984, 1990. 
INDONESIA (1997): WIID; 1990, 1993. 
ITALY (1990): OECD; 1985, 1990. Notice that we use the year of the crisis to reach the number of two 
observations.         
JAPAN (1992): WIID; 1982-1986. 
MALAYSIA (1985): WIID; 1976, 1979, 1984. 
MALAYSIA (1997): WIID; 1990, 1997. Notice that we use the year of the crisis to reach the number of two 
observations. 
NETHERLANDS (2008): OECD; 2000, 2005. 
SINGAPORE (1982): WIID; 1972-1981. 
SWEDEN (1991): OECD; 1985, 1990. 
UNITED KINGDOM (2007): OECD; 2000, 2005. 
UNITED STATES (1984): WIID; 1974-1983. 
UNITED STATES (2007): OECD; 2000, 2005. 
 
A.2 The benchmarks 
As for the computation of the benchmarks behind columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, we proceed as 
follows. In the ten years before the crisis we record the average value of Gini coefficients for OECD 
countries using two different sources: OECD for column 3 and LIS for column 4. When the source 
is OECD, notice that Gini values are provided “around” every 5 years (OECD 2011, p. 25): mid-
80s, around 1990, and so on. In correspondence of these “focal” years, we calculate the OECD 
average. Hence, in the relevant decade before the crisis (with a couple of exceptions, see footnotes 
17 and 18), we have two averages and in such a case we average them. Table A.1 collects such 
benchmarks for each country/crisis. The second column reports the focal years in which OECD 
provides data that we average and show in column 3 (in brackets is the number of countries 
concurring to the average). Remember that the number of OECD members has been growing over 
time. As for the benchmark built on LIS database – as LIS does not provide averages for the OECD 
group – we use the values of Gini coefficient available for OECD countries: for each country we 
select the closest year before the corresponding focal year(s) of column 2 and then we average 
across countries. The outcome, for each country/crisis, is reported in column 4 of Table A.1: again, 
in brackets is the number of countries contributing to the average.15  
                                                          
15 For instance, 0.294 is the relevant value of the OECD benchmark for Finland when using OECD data; 
such number is obtained by averaging the “mid-80s” OECD average (calculated as average of 22 OECD 
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Table A.1. The benchmarks of Table 2 
Country (year of the crisis) Focal OECD years 
(around)16 
OECD average 
(source: OECD)                
OECD average 
(source: LIS) 
Finland (1991) 1985, 1990 0,294 (22, 15) 0,271 (18, 18) 
Germany (2007) 2000, 2000 0, 313 (27, 34) 0,295 (24, 24) 
Iceland (2007) 2000, 2005 0, 313 (27, 34) 0,295 (24, 24) 
India (1993) 1985, 1990 0,294 (22, 15) 0,271 (18, 18) 
Indonesia (1992) 1985, 1990 0,294 (22, 15) 0,271 (18, 18) 
Indonesia (1997) 1990, 1995 0,300 (15, 27) 0,281 (18, 21) 
Italy (1990) 1985, 199017 0,294 (22, 15) 0,271 (18) 
Japan (1992) 1985, 1990 0,294 (22, 15) 0,271 (18, 18) 
Netherlands (2007) 2000, 2005 0, 313 (27, 34) 0,295 (24, 24) 
Spain (2008) 2000, 2005 0, 313 (27, 34) 0,295 (24, 24) 
Sweden (1991) 1985, 1990 0,294 (22, 15) 0,271 (18, 18) 
United Kingdom (2007) 2000, 2005 0, 313 (27, 34) 0,295 (24, 24) 
United States (1984) 1975, 198518 0,291 (8, 22) 0,271 (18) 
United States (2007) 2000, 2005 0, 313 (27, 34) 0,295 (24, 24) 
 
The same procedure undertaken to build the benchmarks of Table 2 (incomes after-tax and 
transfers) is now used to build the benchmarks of Table 4 (incomes before-tax and transfers).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
members) and the “around 1990” OECD average (calculated as average of 15 OECD members). The same 
procedure has been used to build column 4 with LIS data. 
16 We label 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005 the years that OECD labels “mid-70s”, “mid-80s”, “mid-90s” and 
“mid-2000s”,  respectively. 
 
17 OECD does not provide Gini values “around 1980”. This is why we take 1990 as additional focal year, 
although it is the year of the Italian banking crisis. 
 
18 See footnote 17. This is why we take 1985 as additional focal year, although it is (immediately) after the 
1984 American banking crisis.  
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Table A.2. The benchmarks of Table 4 
Country (year of the crisis) Focal OECD  
years (around)19 
OECD average  
(source: OECD) 
Argentina (1989) 1985 0,412 (17) 
Argentina (1995) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
Argentina (2001) 1995, 2000 0,466 (23, 22) 
Brazil (1990) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
Brazil (1994) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
Germany (2007) 2000, 2005 0,462 (22, 33) 
Indonesia (1992) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
Indonesia (1997) 1990, 1995 0,451 (12, 23) 
Italy (1990) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
Japan (1992) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
Malaysia (1985) 1975, 1985 0,405 (8, 17) 
Malaysia (1997) 1990, 1995 0,451 (12, 23) 
Netherlands (2008) 2000, 2005 0,462 (22, 33) 
Singapore (1982) 1975 0,399 (8) 
Sweden (1991) 1985, 1990 0,424 (17, 12) 
United Kingdom (2007) 2000, 2005 0,462 (22, 33) 
United States (1984) 1975 0,399 (8) 
United States (2007) 2000, 2005 0,462 (22, 33) 
 
 
Finally, we collect the benchmarks of Table 5 which takes into account also post-crises periods. The 
number of countries entering the OECD averages are already listed in Table A.1 above;  in the “late 
2000s” such number is 34. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Notice that for Argentina 1989, Singapore 1982 and United States 1984, a focal OECD year would be 
“around 1980”, but Gini coefficient for such year is not provided by OECD and we are left with one focal 
year only. For the same reason, in the benchmark for Brazil 1990 and Italy we take 1985 and 1990, whereas 
for Malaysia 1985 we take 1975 and 1985. 
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Table A.3. The benchmarks of Table 5 
Country (year of the 
crisis) 
Focal OECD 
years (around) 
before crisis 
OECD average 
(source: OECD) 
before crisis                
Focal OECD 
years (around)  
after crisis 
OECD average (source: 
OECD) after crisis               
Finland (1991) 1985, 1990 0,294 1995 0,304 
Germany (2007) 2000, 2005 0,313 Late 2000s 0,314 
Iceland (2007) 2000, 2005 0,313 Late 2000s 0,314 
India (1993) 1985, 1990 0,294 1995 0,304 
Indonesia (1992) 1985, 1990 0,294 1995 0,304 
Indonesia (1997) 1990, 1995 0,300 2000 0,310 
Italy (1990) 1985, 1990 0,294 1990, 1995 0,300 
Japan (1992) 1985, 1990 0,294 1995 0,304 
Netherlands (2007) 2000, 2005 0,313 Late 2000s 0,314 
Spain (2008) 2000, 2005 0,313 Late 2000s 0,314 
Sweden (1991) 1985, 1990 0,294 1995 0,304 
United Kingdom 
(2007) 
2000, 2005 0,313 Late 2000s 0,314 
United States (1984) 1975, 1985 0,291 1985, 1990 0,294 
United States (2007) 2000, 2005 0,313 Late 2000s 0,314 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. The first sample of 14 banking crises: 1984-2008 
Country Year 
Finland 1991 
Germany 2007 
Iceland 2007 
India 1993 
Indonesia 1992, 1997 
Italy 1990 
Japan 1992 
Netherlands 2008 
Spain 2008 
Sweden 1991 
United Kingdom 2007 
United States 1984, 2007 
 
Table 2. After-tax income inequality and banking crises 
Country Year Relative to 
OECD 
average 
(source: 
OECD) 
Relative to 
OECD 
average 
(source: 
LIS) 
    
Finland 1991 BELOW BELOW 
Germany 2007 BELOW BELOW 
Iceland 2007 BELOW BELOW 
India 1993 ABOVE ABOVE 
Indonesia 1992 ABOVE ABOVE 
Indonesia 1997 ABOVE ABOVE 
Italy 1990 ABOVE ABOVE 
Japan 1992 ABOVE ABOVE 
Netherlands 2008 BELOW BELOW 
Spain 2008 ABOVE ABOVE 
Sweden 1991 BELOW BELOW 
United Kingdom 2007 ABOVE ABOVE 
United States 1984 ABOVE ABOVE 
United States 2007 ABOVE ABOVE 
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Table 3. The second sample of 18 banking crises: 1982-2008 
Country Year 
Argentina 1989,1995, 2001 
Brazil 1990,1994 
Germany 2007 
Indonesia 1992,1997 
Italy 1990 
Japan 1992 
Malaysia 1985, 1997 
Netherlands 2008 
Singapore 1982 
Sweden 1991 
United Kingdom 2007 
United States 1984, 2007 
 
Table 4. Before-tax income inequality and banking crises 
Country Year Whole 
sample  
Restricted 
sample 
    
Argentina 1989 ABOVE ABOVE 
Argentina 1995 ABOVE ABOVE 
Argentina 2001 ABOVE ABOVE 
Brazil 1990 ABOVE ABOVE 
Brazil 1994 ABOVE ABOVE 
Germany 2007 ABOVE  
Indonesia 1992 BELOW  
Indonesia 1997 BELOW  
Italy 1990 ABOVE  
Japan 1992 BELOW BELOW 
Malaysia 1985 ABOVE ABOVE 
Malaysia 1997 BELOW  
Netherlands 2008 BELOW  
Singapore 1982 ABOVE ABOVE 
Sweden 1991 BELOW  
United Kingdom 2007 ABOVE  
United States 1984 ABOVE ABOVE 
United States 2007 ABOVE  
 
23 
 
Table 5. Inequality Above or Below the OECD average before and after 14 banking crises (incomes 
after-tax and transfers) 
 
Country (year of the 
crisis) 
Pattern before and after 
the crisis 
Finland (1991) Below/Below 
Germany (2007) Below/Below 
Iceland (2007) Below/Below 
India (1993) Above/n. a. 
Indonesia (1992) Above/Above 
Indonesia (1997)20 Above/n. a. 
Italy (1990) Above/Above 
Japan (1992) Above/Above 
Netherlands (2007) Below/Below 
Spain (2008) Above/ n. a. 
Sweden (1991) Below/Below 
United Kingdom 
(2007) 
Above/Above 
United States (1984) Above/Above 
United States (2007) Above/Above 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
20 Notice that only for Indonesia, in Table 5, we allow for an overlap of reference periods between different 
crises: observations for 1993 and 1996 belong indeed to the pre-1997 crisis as well as to the post-1992 crisis. 
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Table 6. Inequality Above or Below the OECD average (incomes after-tax and transfers) in 25 
OECD countries: b. c. means banking crisis in the decade; n m. means that the country was not 
member of OECD in the decade; n. a. means that the data for the country is not available in the 
period. (Source: LIS) 
 
Countries ‘80s ‘90s 2000s 
Australia Above Above Above 
Austria Below Below Below 
Belgium Below Below Below 
Canada Above Above Above 
Czech Republic n. m. Below Below 
Denmark Below Below Below 
Finland Below b. c. Below 
France Above Above Below 
Germany Below Below b. c. 
Greece n. a. Above Above 
Hungary n. m. Above Above 
Ireland Above  Above Above 
Italy b. c. Above Above 
Luxembourg Below Below Below 
Mexico n. m. Above Above 
Netherlands Below Below b. c. 
Norway b. c. Below Below 
Poland n. m.  Above Above 
Slovak Republic n. m. Below Below 
Slovenia n. m. n. m. Below 
Spain Above n. a. b. c. 
Sweden Below b. c. Below 
Switzerland Above Above Below 
United Kingdom Above Above b. c. 
United States b. c. Above b. c. 
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Table 7. Inequality Above or Below the OECD average (incomes before-tax and transfers) in 16 
OECD countries: b. c. means banking crisis in the decade; n m. means that the country was not 
member of OECD in the decade; n. a. means that the data for the country is not available in the 
period. (Source: OECD) 
 
Countries ‘80s ‘90s 2000s 
Australia n. a. Above Below 
Austria n. a. n. a. Below 
Belgium Above Above Above 
Canada Below Below Below 
Czech Republic n. m. Below Above 
Denmark Below Below Below 
Finland Above b. c. Below 
France n. a. Above Above 
Germany Above Below b. c.  
Greece Above Below Below 
Hungary n. m. Above Above 
Italy b. c. Above Above 
Luxembourg Below Below Below 
Mexico n. m. Above Above 
Netherlands Above Above b. c. 
Norway b. c. Below Below 
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Figure 1: After-tax income inequality and banking crises
Countries in bold are ABOVE the timely OECD average.
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Figure 2: Before-tax income inequality and banking crises
Countries in bold are ABOVE the timely OECD average.
 
